ABSTRACT
Big events in world politics, Peter Gourevitch noted long ago (Gourevitch 1977: 281), provide students of international relations and comparative politics with the closest thing to a natural experiment. The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 are no exception. The al Qaeda terrorist organization, an extensive cross-border network of violence-prone groups and individuals, created with its attacks a second “day of infamy” reminiscent of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Those terrorists involved in the attacks held fervently religious beliefs, came from a wide variety of national backgrounds, were well educated, practiced secular lifestyles, and moved unobtrusively in liberal societies. Loosely linked through both a common vision and a few trusted emissaries, al Qaeda appears to form neither a clear network nor a clear hierarchy. Its organization thus differs from groups traditionally engaged in left-or right-wing violence in industrial societies (Katzenstein 1998).
