ABSTRACT
I have argued that if property/event dualism is true, it provides evidence for the existence of God. Recall the distinction between a C-inductive (one in which the premises add to the probability and, in this sense, confirms the conclusion) and a P-inductive (one in which the premises make the conclusion more probable than not) argument. I have argued that AC is at least a correct C-inductive argument, though as a part of a cumulative case, consciousness contributes to a P-inductive theistic argument. In chapter two, I provided a pre´cis of some evidence for the antecedent
of the conditional, though it was not, nor is it now within my objectives to make a case for property/event dualism. In my view, property/event and substance dualism are so obviously true, that it is hard to see why there is so much contemporary hostility to dualism in its various incarnations. At the very least, there are reasons to believe that the rejection of dualism is not primarily a result of the poor intellectual credentials of dualism or the unproblematic nature of strong physicalism. Consider the following pronouncement by Barry Stroud:
‘‘Naturalism’’ seems to me . . . rather like ‘‘World Peace.’’ Almost everyone swears allegiance to it, and is willing to march under its banner. But disputes can still break out about what it is appropriate or acceptable to do in the name of that slogan. And like world peace, once you start specifying concretely exactly what it involves and how to achieve it, it becomes increasingly difficult to reach and to sustain a consistent and exclusive ‘‘naturalism.’’ There is pressure on the one hand to include more and more within your conception of ‘‘nature,’’ so it loses its definiteness and restrictiveness. Or, if the conception is kept fixed and restrictive, there is pressure on the other hand to distort or even to deny the very phenomena that a naturalistic study-and especially a naturalistic study of human beings-is supposed to explain.1
