By mid-1967, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units were feeling the eﬀects of American-led attacks. While they never suﬀered a decisive defeat, the costs of engaging American forces and their superior ﬁrepower were beginning to tell. Since a decision among the top North Vietnamese leadership in 1966 to seek a decisive victory at an opportune point in the war, North Vietnamese leaders had discussed the idea of a general oﬀensive to force the United States to withdraw from Vietnam and irreversibly weaken the South Vietnamese government. The problem, however, came in establishing favorable battleﬁeld conditions to initiate such an oﬀensive. The United States had continued its steady escalation of forces in South Vietnam, and although PAVN and PLAF tactics were designed to minimize casualties, American ﬁrepower was having an adverse eﬀect. Moreover, as the war settled into a stalemate in 1967, the lack of progress toward victory had an adverse eﬀect on morale, especially among the NLF insurgents in the South.