ABSTRACT
Aristotle’s theory of causation has multiple threads, and his texts invite multiple interpretations. The variation in interpretation is, in part, a result of different perspectives and questions that are brought to the text. For instance, Aristotle’s theory of the four causes has invited scrutiny from contemporary philosophers of science, who are interested in theories of explanation (van Fraassen 1977) as well as philosophers of biology, who are interested in teleology, taxonomy and other concepts (Gotthelf 1987). This chapter looks at Aristotle’s theory of causal powers in relation to contemporary realist theories of causation in science and social science.Within this broad topic I focus on twoaspects ofAristotle’s ontology of causal powers that are crucial for an adequate understanding of his views and yet, unlike Aristotle’s essentialism and theory of natural kinds, have not received the attention they deserve. I am thinking of the fact that Aristotle does not differentiate ontologically between rational and non-rational causal powers, and the fact that both types of power rest upon the ontological distinction between potentiality and actuality. The first topic should interest philosophers trying to extend a realist account of causation from the physical sciences to the social sciences. The second topic is of relevance to contemporary philosophers interested in exploring the metaphysical commitments of causal powers.
