ABSTRACT
An inquiry into the competing explanations of the problem of military control in various settings offers important insights. During the analysis of causal factors likely to precipitate military coups, it is strikingly revealed that variables such as high defence expenditure are not a sufficient cause of coups. Similarly, the presence of a professional military is unlikely to act as a deterrent to the occurrence of a military coup d’état. By drawing on the example of Pakistan, variables such as the absence of parliamentary or civilian oversight of defence affairs and the involvement of the military in civilian administration illustrate the military’s incremental increase in influence and control. Considering the experience of the military coups in some Latin American countries, this chapter demonstrates that it becomes increasingly difficult (barring systemic crises or critical junctures) for countries to roll back the extent of the military’s influence, once it is politically asserted. These conclusions challenge the conventional views on political developments in Pakistan, and raise questions about the appropriate response of the international community.
