chapter  2
Acquiescence and necessity
Pages 19

In Chapter 1 I claimed that we tend to respond to ethical views under the

sway of both a pro-pragmatic and an anti-pragmatic intuition. Since it is

extremely pragmatic, Act Teleology gains support from the pro-pragmatic

intuition. However, in some cases its implications clash with the anti-prag-

matic intuition. In these cases we have the sense that Act Teleology is

insufficiently principled, and so we may consider modifying it or departing

from it in some way. If so, we should examine the features that make it

very pragmatic and consider whether to endorse them on reflection. At the end of Chapter 1 I suggested that if we are moved by the anti-pragmatic

intuition we should focus on two of Act Teleology’s structural features in

particular: its consequence-neutrality, and the fact that it is act-based. We

should consider adopting a discounting view, or adopting a broader unit of

action.