ABSTRACT
The term ‘moral particularism’ has been used to refer to different doctrines.
The main body of this paper begins by identifying the most important
doctrines associated with the term, at least as the term is used by Jonathan
Dancy, on whose work I will focus. I then discuss whether holism in the
theory of reasons supports moral particularism, and I call into question the
thesis that particular judgements have epistemological priority over general
principles. Dancy’s recent book Ethics without Principles (Dancy 2004)
makes much of a distinction between reasons, enablers, disablers, intensifiers, and attenuators. I will suggest that the distinction is unnecessary, and I
will argue that, even if there is such a distinction, it does not entail moral
particularism. In the final two sections, I try to give improved versions of
arguments against particularism that I put forward in my paper ‘Moral
Particularism: Wrong and Bad’ (Hooker 2000b: 1-22, esp. pp. 7-11, 15-22).
Whenever an action is morally required, of course there is some moral
reason to do it. Likewise, whenever an action is morally wrong, there is some
moral reason not to do it. The same is true for other so-called thin moral
properties, properties such as being morally bad, being morally vicious, etc.
