ABSTRACT

It is an understatement to say that the rationale for and the effects of the decision made by the administration of President George W. Bush to invade Iraq were controversial. Contentious issues such as the implications of preventative war, the lack of sanctioning provided by the United Nations, the missing weapons of mass destruction, and the justifications for invasion on humanitarian grounds are the focal points for discussion and criticism. One particular issue concerns the unprecedented degree to which private security firms support and backstop the US-led coalition’s efforts in Iraq. Because of the estimated tens of thousands of private security personnel in Iraq, and the wide variety of important functions they perform, this substantial private presence has received the label of “the coalition of the billing.”1 In 2003, one of the tasks allotted to private firms such as Vinnell Corporation, DynCorp, and Erinys was the training and reform of Iraq’s security sector institutions. This choice received considerable criticism in large part because of the poor showing of privately trained Iraqi security sector personnel as evident in desertion rates and operational performance. While security sector training and reform are very important in the Iraqi context, responsibility for these problems, for the most part, should not rest on the shoulders of private firms. Factors related to the insurgency, a lack of planning by government departments and challenges in terms of funding, supply, and actual capabilities all served to militate against a strong performance of privately trained Iraqi security sector personnel. Nevertheless, longer-term issues pose considerable challenges for firms, the stability of Iraq, the normative development of the security sector institutions, and the array of policy options available to the United States.