ABSTRACT
The surfacing of predictive and probabilistic genetic information, potentially treated as a new kind of social and economic commodity on markets for social goods such as insurance and employment, raises a variety of superimposed and crossed ethical, legal and social dilemmas (Callahan, 1996). Should employers and insurers be allowed to mandate genetic testing as a precondition to employment or insurance, and to screen out from the workforce or insurance pools those at higher than average risk of future disease and disability or premature death? Will genetic information impact on the range of job opportunities available to those diagnosed with a sub-optimal genetic make-up? Could genetic information condition access and pricing in healthcare, in life and disability insurance? If they cannot enforce genetic testing, should employers and insurers nevertheless be allowed to require individuals to disclose results of previous genetic tests results? May current and potential employees and policy-holders voluntarily disclose genetic information to employers and insurers when disclosure would allow them to be hired preferentially or to demonstrate to the insurer that they should not be placed in a substandard class of risks? Whereas the general public fears that genetic information will be misused by private and public institutions as a basis for withholding certain rights, privileges or benefits or granting such benefits only on less favourable conditions than would otherwise be imposed, private and public institutions are particularly concerned about the allocative inefficiencies and potential business disruptions they would endure being denied access to genetic insights about the individuals they are dealing with in contractual contexts. Individuals’ rights to privacy and interests in employment and insurance must be weighed against the interests of insurers and employers in using genetic information to better estimate future costs.
