ABSTRACT
The argument made in the last chapter – that wars happen because there are discrepancies between states’ power shares and their benefit shares – is surely different from the standard conclusion reached by American scholars on international relations in general and on China in particular. This argument is likely to be controversial. It calls attention to the reason why a rising state may be dissatisfied, namely that the benefits it receives from the international system are not fully in accord with its relative power. This motivation to wage war, however, does not have to apply only to this rising power. A dominant power may be equally motivated to fight in order to keep the benefits to which it has become accustomed or even to pursue policies that are intended to further increase its benefits. When the international distribution of benefits is not fully or quickly adjusted to reflect the new international distribution of power, this disequilibrium becomes a source for war. If countries receive their “fair” share of benefits in proportion to their power share, there is no incentive for them to go to war because they cannot hope to improve their position by threatening war. Any such threat would not be credible.
