ABSTRACT
The data presented in the last chapter show that there have been occasions in the past when a power transition has occurred peacefully. For instance, Russia/the USSR and the U.K. were overtaken by Japan, Germany, India, and/or China in recent years. These changes in their relative position, however, did not result in war. The failure for war to break out on these occasions does not necessarily invalidate the power-transition theory. This theory can explain the non-occurrence of war on at least two grounds. First, these power transitions did not apply to the central contenders for international dominance. Second, the regime characteristics of some states make any power transition involving them less likely to result in war. Having already taken up the first rationale, I address the second consideration in this chapter. Concerns expressed by those who subscribe to the “China threat” school and by those who call attention to the perils of power transition are based on the view that China is not a status-quo power. In the words of the current U.S. Secretary of State, “China resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This means that China is not a ‘status-quo’ power, but one that would like to alter Asia’s strategic balance in its own favor.”1 This remark implies that a country’s status-quo orientation is to be judged by its support of or opposition to the dominant power, and that the dominant power is itself not tempted to create a more favorable strategic balance for itself.
