Learning to Negotiate: Novice and Experienced Negotiators
Two linked studies in many ways began the field’s experimental examination of learning and experience in negotiation. First, Bazerman, Magliozzi, and Neale (1985) found that undergraduates in a market simulation learned to logroll issues (concede on a low-value issue to gain on a priority issue; Froman & Cohen, 1970) and thereby increase their gains as they repeatedly bargained over the same three issues with new partners. Second, Neale and Northcraft (1986) found that corporate real estate negotiators with about 10 years of experience also learned to logroll issues in the same market simulation, although their initial rates of logrolling exceeded that of the undergraduates. The real estate negotiators also completed more transactions in the same amount of time than did the undergraduates. Finally, both groups were influenced by a framing manipulation (values reported as losses or gains) and a goal-setting manipulation (on the number of transactions to complete).