ABSTRACT
This monograph has sought to advance two closely related but distinct arguments. First, we have argued that Korea must now be understood as an unambiguously neo-liberal state and that the state’s interventions in the economy since the crisis have been driven by explicitly neo-liberal concerns. The key components of a neo-liberal regulatory regime are now in place. Systems of corporate governance and financial regulation have been completely overhauled so as to bring them into conformity with global standards of ‘best practice’ as defined by leading neo-liberal states and supranational institutions. At the same time the extensive controls on foreign investment that had existed prior to the crisis were dismantled and policy is now framed so as to promote rather than prevent the sale of strategic assets to foreign investors. Equally significantly, systems of labour regulation have been reformed so as to enhance flexibility (the ability of firms to dismiss unwanted employees) and the new welfare regime is being constructed so as to prioritise concerns about competitiveness as opposed to equality.
