ABSTRACT
Since 9/11, the Bush administration has consciously refashioned the American
role in world politics from that of benign hegemon to that of neo-imperialist.
It has abandoned the ‘soft power’ politics of constructive engagement and
multilateralism in favour of the ‘hard power’ politics of the war on terror-
ism. But as the increasingly unpopular Iraq war runs headlong into rising
expenses and American causalities it is seen as inevitable – and for many,
preferable – that the US war on terrorism will eventually have to rely much
more on soft-power political strategies. Understood as the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion, soft power can,
advocates claim, make allies out of Islamists, repair US relationships with its
disenchanted allies and even put ‘third world’ states on the right path
toward development (Nye and Owens 1996; Lennon 2003; Fukuyama 2004;
Nye 2004a, 2004d). In this way, soft power promises to be a ‘means to
success in world politics’ (Nye 2004b). Indeed, soft power is touted not just
as a tool for the USA to use in its effort to right its relations but as a tool
that can be used by any country or any actor in world politics to achieve a greater degree of influence over the dynamics of world politics (Maley 2003;
Smyth 2001).
