ABSTRACT
Analysis of the impact of the ESS on American views of transatlantic relations and the European Union’s role within them must begin at the beginning: Washington’s differential reactions to the ESS in its initial months in 2003. This is in part because of the general hubris of the Bush administration about Washington’s centrality to all events and developments. As seen from Washington in June 2003, the United States was the target audience for development of the ESS. Washington had not only been Europe’s sparring partner in the extremely painful transatlantic confrontations over the Iraq war in late 2002 and early 2003 (Gordon and Shapiro 2004; Shawcross 2004). It was also the principal sceptic to be persuaded regarding the emerging ESDP and the European Union’s new status as a strategic actor with a vision and a broad strategic doctrine to guide its efforts. At least, Washington was to see and understand the carefully crafted ESS vocabulary that invoked the general words and thrust of Bush’s own National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002.
