chapter  7
34 Pages

Interrupting phenomenology: Jacques Derrida

In a review of a book that spoke of a ‘turn to phenomenology’ in recent analytic philosophy, Ian Hacking observes that talk of phenomenology in this context typically refers to what is revealed to us from the standpoint of ‘introspection’, a standpoint, he rightly insists, that has little to do with the concerns of ‘Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and others who are normally identified with phenomenology’.1 Hacking also suggests that it is really no good trying to grab the title for an introspectionist method either, since ‘Husserl and his descendents’ explicitly insist on the crucial difference between the reflective perspective of phenomenology and the naı¨ve objectivism of introspective psychology. Closing off any major adjustment to what might be written in the name of phenomenology, Hacking asserts that Husserl and his descendants ‘now own the name’.2