ABSTRACT
The fall of communism in Central Europe raised premature hopes in Taipei that diplomatic ties could be established with former communist states. It was, however, the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991 that opened up the biggest opportunity for Taiwan’s economic diplomacy. As the Baltic states’ daring policy on Taiwan in the early 1990s demonstrated, not all post-Soviet states felt bound by the ‘traditional friendship’ with the PRC, and their urgent economic needs predisposed them favourably towards Taipei’s promises of eco- nomic assistance in exchange for some sort of official relationship. Among 15 states that emerged from the ruins of the USSR, Russia was the biggest, most populous, the richest in natural resources and – due to its military power and per- manent membership in the UN Security Council – the state that possessed the greatest influence in international affairs. Had Russia developed ‘substantive’ ties with Taiwan, this could have had a positive effect on the dynamics of cross- Strait relations in the ROC’s favour and aided Taipei’s efforts to re-enter the international community. Official relations between Russia and Taiwan would have been a major diplomatic coup, crowning Taipei’s decades-long efforts to escape Beijing-imposed international isolation. China was understandably anxious to obstruct development of relations in any form between Moscow and Taipei. As a result, a pattern of triangular relationships emerged, with China and Taiwan locked in positions of enmity, while Moscow’s pivotal position allowed it to court the two Chinas and reap the benefits.
