ABSTRACT
The previous chapter considered whether the established rules gov-
erning the use of military force (only in self-defense, collective self-
defense, or with the authorization of the Security Council under
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter) are breaking down. The chapter con-
cluded that the rules are not ‘‘breaking down’’ as such; they have never
been fully observed, they have often been violated, yet states (even those
states which believe they are capable of unilaterally ensuring their own
security) have generally sought to maintain them because the costs of the alternatives (deterrence, alliances, unilateral military capacity,
hegemony) generally outweigh the benefits. These alternatives are,
moreover, beyond the means of most states. In addition, states gen-
erally prefer a rule-based system because it provides a measure of
predictability in international politics. The chapter conceded that this
equation has potentially been upset by the over-riding preeminence of
one country: no other state – or even group of states – has the power
to present a credible deterrent against the arbitrary use of force by the US. However, there is not enough evidence to suggest that the US will
disregard the UN Charter in this way on a repeated basis.
