ABSTRACT
We now turn to an examination of the previous attempts to capture the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung within logical calculi. These consist primarily o f the systems developed by Alonzo Church under the description, “the Logic o f Sense and Denotation,” and the various reformulations and revisions to these systems devised by David Kaplan, C.A. Anderson, Pavel Tichÿ and Charles Parsons.1 The discussion o f these systems in this context serves two primary purposes. Firstly, it provides a general strategy for how to incorporate the commitments of the theory of Sinn and Bedeutung in a logical system, and this overall strategy will be carried forward to the system presented in the next chapter. Secondly, scrutinizing how well these systems reflect
Frege’s own theories in logic and semantics provides insight into what would be required of a logical calculus if it were to capture Frege’s views accurately. The conclusions reached in this regard will loom large in the following chapters.
