ABSTRACT
Nietzsche distinguishes master and slave morality according to two sets of estimation: good and bad in master morality, and good and evil in slave morality. Master types discover what is good out of their own condition of strength; they experience pleasure and exaltation in their victories and their distance from the powerless. Characteristics such as courage, conquest, aggression, and command that produce the feelings of power are deemed "good;' while traits of weaker types such as cowardice, passivity, humility, and dependence are deemed "bad:' Nietzsche finds support for his analysis in the etymology of ancient words for good and bad, which generally connoted "noble" and "base," "superior" and "inferior" (BGE 260; GM I, 5). What is important for Nietzsche here is that good and bad are not absolutes. What is good is good only for the master; what is bad in the slave arouses embarrassment and contempt in the master, but not condemnation or denial. In fact the existence of the slave is essential for maintaining the master's sense of distance, rank, and thus "goodness." The condition of the slave is not esteemed but at the same time it is not annulled, since it provides the master with psychological (and material) benefits. In sum, what is good for the master is something active, immediate, and spontaneous, arising directly out of the master's accomplishment; what is bad is a secondary judgment in contrast to an antecedent experience of self-worth.
