ABSTRACT
In this chapter we propose to trace the recent history of a counterintuitive observation in the neurosciences that comprises descriptions of active processing whereby strong stimulus forces evoke weak or insignificant associations, and where weak forces evoke stronger associates. This phenomenon has been labeled “paradoxical,” since it is opposed to the normal situation whereby strong elements in a network associate with their most frequent associates, and weak elements in a network associate with less frequent associates. We chart the trajectory of the notion as it weaves its way from the Pavlovian physiology of conditioned reflexes and stimulus-response motorsensory reflexes of vegetative and alimentary levels to the neuropsychology of Sigmund Freud, Alexander Luria, and the connectionist modeling of late twentieth-century neuropsychological science. Our purpose is to highlight the fact that the threads of this paradoxical phase of stimulus-response balance, or rather imbalance, have been cast at three distinct levels of explanation in the neurosciences: Pavlovian physiology; Luria’s concomitant neuropsychology of language; and Trevor Harley’s connectionist modeling. We emphasize that the situation is one that argues for a unification or alignment rather than any reduction of Luria’s neurolinguistics or Harley’s connectionism to Pavlov’s physiology.
