ABSTRACT
Introduction The Clinton administration’s Iraq policy provoked considerable opposition from conservative critics within Congress and the wider national security establishment in Washington. These critics shared the Clinton administration’s perception of the threat from Iraq and they agreed that Saddam Hussein was the root cause of this threat. Some argued that the threat was greater than that articulated by the White House. However, serious disagreement emerged on the viability of Clinton’s containment strategy. Critics in Washington’s conservative think-tanks denounced containment as a failure that was symptomatic of Clinton’s ‘feckless’ foreign policy. They advocated a more aggressive approach to the threat posed by Baghdad centred on the removal of the regime, rather than indefinite containment. This was more than just a preferred policy option; it was portrayed as an imperative for US national security interests. Without regime change Iraq would emerge as a WMD-armed adversary in a region of enormous geopolitical importance. These critics insisted that military force should be used in conjunction with support for the Iraqi opposition to rid the world of Saddam Hussein. During the last two years of the Clinton administration, critics developed and advocated a coherent strategy for military-led regime change that, they argued, could be quickly and easily implemented.
