ABSTRACT
Antagonism and confrontation between the two Koreas grew steadily during 1948-50 through inflammatory rhetoric, subversion, insurrection and guerrilla warfare, but the two Koreas stopped short of full-scale warfare. Despite Syngman Rhee’s ‘March north!’ rhetoric, the South lacked even a semblance of the means to force a military solution to the reunification issue, and while the North had substantial military assets it could not be certain of success if it acted alone. From Pyongyang’s perspective, full Soviet backing was vital to successful military action, but during the late 1940s Stalin was consistently reluctant to provide such backing for fear of the US response. However, during the early months of 1950 he gradually became convinced that the US would not intervene if the DPRK could achieve a swift victory, and so Soviet policy changed to support for a fullscale invasion. The new communist government in China also gave its support, and this removed the chief constraint on military action. On 25 June 1950 the North invaded the South.
