ABSTRACT
Regimes form a special kind of cooperative order in political economy,
where international actors construct shared rules and norms in pursuit of collective goods. Regimes depend on sovereign nations to enforce these
norms and rules domestically and a capacity to deny collective benefits to
actors behaving outside the norms. Because of voluntary regimes (as
opposed to imperative hierarchies based on power), the interests (both ideal
and material) that invite conformity with specific regime norms and rules
must have some domestic basis. The sovereign state, defining the unit of
participation, is the ‘‘latch’’ of international cooperation, while domestic
sovereignty provides a system of norms of reciprocity, contract and the rule of law that acts as a ‘‘hinge’’ of performance. States ‘‘latch’’ onto regimes in
order to share their benefits with other states and to deny benefits to those
who will not conform. At the same time, effective regimes ‘‘hinge’’ on
domestic administrative machinery and commensurate behavioral practices
to make transnational norms binding. Sovereignty, therefore, defines both
the unit of action and the normative basis of compliance.
