ABSTRACT
Clausewitzian elements influenced the United States in its long involvement in the wars of Indochina: ‘‘Chance, free will, and necessity – all interweaving by working together as one; chance by turn rules either and has the last featuring blow at events.’’1 The country changed its policies towards Vietnam as the United States changed presidents in 1961. President John F. Kennedy increased intervention in Vietnamese affairs. He did so out of perceived necessity. The United States provided increasing amounts of financial aid, military assistance, and advisors to support the continuing policy of containment. The experience of the Korean War gave priority to military aspects of aid to counter ‘‘wars of national liberation’’ as the Cold War developed in the 1950s.2 US Army responses chose the culturally and doctrinally familiar in response to the incessant, internal struggles for defense resources and the intellectual struggle to assimilate ‘‘lessons’’ from World War Two and Korea.
