ABSTRACT
The demise of the New Order in 1998 ushered in a search for new ways of governing Indonesia. Throughout the country there were calls for reformasi, or ‘reform’. In the first place this meant democratization and an end to corruption, collusion, and nepotism. What else it would mean, however, was often unclear. During the 32 years of the New Order, political party independence had been circumscribed, and the development of civil society organizations (CSOs) restricted. Despite reformasi, to a large extent people still lack the capacity to engage in political activities, lobby for their interests, engage in public debate, suggest alternative policies, or resolve conflicts peacefully (Antlöv 2003: 74-5). In 1998, when I returned to the Sumatran village where I had conducted fieldwork before, I already observed that a renewed role of adat (customary) institutions in government might offer a way out of Indonesia’s political malaise. Not everybody, however, was in favour of a stronger role for adat leaders. One cause for concern was the question of whose interests would be represented by adat, and whose would not. Critics also argued that adat was old-fashioned and that adat leaders were frequently not the most capable of people. More beneficial, these critics suggested, would be the creation, development, and strengthening of a ‘civil society’ reaching beyond ethnic, religious, or regional boundaries. However, civil society’s role in a contemporary Indonesia experiencing a rise in sectarianism, ethnocentrism, and renewed regionalism is itself uncertain. Many CSOs are actually exclusive in character, encompassing only small interest groups. It is wrong to see adat and civil society as two opposing forces. In fact the foundations of some CSOs are based on adat.
