ABSTRACT
An extraordinary number of field studies have found that local groups of resource users have created a wide diversity of institutional arrangements for coping with common-pool resources when they have not been prevented from doing so by central authorities (McCay and Acheson 1987, Fortmann and Bruce 1988, Berkes 1989, V. Ostrom et al. 1993, Netting 1993, Bromley et al. 1992, Tang 1992, Blomquist 1992). These empirical studies document successful self-organized resource governance systems in diverse sectors in all parts of the world. Examples also exist of commons dilemmas that have continued unabated. From the extensive empirical evidence, one can conclude that overuse and destruction of commonpool resources do not always occur, but it also is not an inescapable outcome when multiple users face a commons dilemma. While many groups succeed, others fail in their efforts to do so, and overcoming a commons dilemma is always a struggle (Dietz et al. 2003).1
