ABSTRACT
In summer 1966 the IDF General Staff arrived at the conclusion that the only way to halt terrorist activity was to inflict a resounding military blow on Syria. From the moment the Damascus regime had ‘adopted’ Fatah and began to activate it, there was a consensus among Israeli generals on the need to impose a ‘frontal clash’ on Syria which would shake the radical regime, perhaps even cause it to collapse and, in any event, force it to abandon the idea of a ‘popular struggle’. The model which they envisaged was based on the 1956 Sinai Campaign which had put a stop to ‘fidaiyyun’ raids from the Gaza Strip. Egypt was now embroiled in Yemen, the Arab world was polarized and split, and Nasser was constantly proclaiming that he would not be lured into a war before the time was ripe. The situation appeared opportune for decisive action against Syria. While the close relations between Damascus and Moscow aroused some apprehension, it seemed reasonable to assume that if the Israeli blow was swiftly delivered, it would achieve its objectives without inducing the Soviet Union and Egypt to intervene.
