ABSTRACT
Yitzhak Rabin writes that on 25 May, Eshkol rejected decisively the pressure being brought to bear by the IDF.1 The extant documents contradict Rabin’s version of events, and reveal that Eshkol did not reject the pressure on that day. On the contrary, he was persuaded by the senior command and by Yigal Allon’s arguments that Israel was under immediate and critical danger of attack and hence it was vital for the IDF to strike the first blow. Eshkol wrestled with the issue and contemplated convening an urgent session of the government to take the necessary decision. However, there was no way of escaping the trap created by Eban’s mission, and there was now no alternative but to wait until he returned or, at least, until after his meeting with the US President. The senior commanders gritted their teeth and waited, believing that every passing hour increased the danger and would make it harder for the IDF to conduct itself in the inevitable confrontation. When Eban eventually returned, and the government decided to go on waiting, a full-blown crisis erupted between the political and military echelons.
