ABSTRACT
It was a day of tense anticipation when the Foreign Minister met with President Lyndon Johnson on 26 May. Reports received from the embassy in Washington on contacts of Eban and senior Israeli representatives with White House and State Department officials made it clear that the Americans were unconvinced by the Israeli estimate that an Egyptian attack was imminent, and were even suspicious of Israel’s motives.1 Eban conferred with Defence Secretary Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The latter dismissed the Israeli evaluation and, on behalf of the President, voiced uncompromising objections to preventive action on Israel’s part and rejected the Israeli demand for a US declaration that any attack on Israeli would be tantamount to an attack on the United States. Eban pointed out to Rusk that he needed to return home urgently in order to attend the decisive government session. The government’s decisions, he emphasized, would be based on whatever Johnson told him, and the only thing that could prevent war would be ‘the President’s assurance that he has taken a resolute and unconditional decision to open the Straits, including a declaration and a detailed letter to the Prime Minister’.2
