ABSTRACT
In the first chapter of this book we have argued for the thesis that the onto-
logical foundation of causation is to be found in the causal relation between
events. We have suggested a reduction of that relation in physical terms. Two
events are causally related if and only if an amount of a conserved quantity
is transmitted from one to the other. This analysis is incompatible with the
still very influential nomological theory of causation. There are two major
differences between these rival accounts, regarding the role laws of nature
play in causation. First, as we have seen in the first chapters of the book, the only type of laws appearing in the physical reduction of the causal relation
are conservation laws. These laws are strict, in the sense that their validity
excludes the possibility of exceptions. Second, the instantiation of a con-
servation law is, according to our analysis, not sufficient for the existence of
a causal relation: in a closed system containing pseudo-processes, the global
energy is conserved but this does not make the pseudo-processes causal.
