ABSTRACT
In late 1963, Athens completely lost control over developments in Cyprus. This was a period of internal crisis in Greece: the inconclusive November 1963 election brought the CU to power without an overall majority in Parliament, then, in late December, a new election was proclaimed and a caretaker government was appointed. In the meantime, in late November, Makarios proposed his Thirteen Points for revising the Cypriot constitution.1 The proposal was rejected by Turkey before the Turkish Cypriots had the chance to comment on it. Intercommunal clashes broke out in late December. By that time, both sides in Cyprus were armed to the teeth and had plans for action against each other. In September, Turkish-Cypriot armed groups had prepared for confrontation. Immediately after the eruption of the clashes, such armed groups created enclaves which did not recognize the authority of the government, and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership also encouraged its people to withdraw into these enclaves.2 The Greek Cypriots also had plans for armed action – for example, the infamous ‘Akritas Plan’, drafted by the Minister of the Interior (and, from spring 1964, also of Defence) Polykarpos Giorkatzis. The Akritas Plan is indicative of the confusion and wishful thinking of the Greek-Cypriot side at that crucial moment. The plan suggested that the Greek Cypriots should aim at a quick victory: ‘if we prevail within one or two days, no outside intervention will be possible, probable or justified’.3
