ABSTRACT
Widespread outrage at the Madrid bombing in March 2004 that killed 191 and wounded countless others produced mass demonstrations across Spain. Indonesians, on the other hand, continue to view terrorism as a relatively minor problem, despite being the victims of four major terrorist attacks since 2002, and there have been no major demonstrations against terrorism. While public anger has grown with each new attack, the backlash has been quiet and private, with the exception of the Hindu island of Bali, where livelihoods have been devastated by terrorism. The Pew International Research Center for People and the Press, Global Attitudes Survey, 2005, noted a significant drop in support for suicide bombings against civilian targets. When asked if it was justified often or sometimes, support dipped from 27 percent in August 2002 to 15 percent in March 2005. Likewise, people who had a lot of confidence in Osama bin Laden dropped from 58 percent in May 2003 to 35 percent in March 2005. And for those who said it was never justified, the number increased from 54 to 66 percent respectively.1 Yet, in the same poll, half of the respondents saw Islamic extremism as a threat and more than half supported counter-terrorist operations.2 At the same time, the Indonesian electorate elected Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president by a wide margin in September 2004, in some measure because the majority of people thought he could restore political stability and crack down on violence and lawlessness. What this says about Indonesian society is unclear. At the very least, it suggests
that a considerable number of Indonesians may be complacent, confident that moderates are in the majority and that there is little chance their way of life will be threatened by radical Islamism. Conversely, it might suggest that there is some sympathy within the population at large for the goals-if not the meansof terrorist groups like JI. We know that jihadists have worked with radical Muslim groups, student organizations, civic organizations, militias, and politicians. Whether or not those jihadists have been able to form broader ties to society as a whole is still unknown. Indeed, it is worth remembering that even with growing religious piety in society, the region is hardly a fertile ground for
dogmatic interpretations of Islam that the radicals are espousing. Still, organizations like JI do not need large numbers to be dangerous. Preceding chapters have examined three distinct categories of radical Islamic
groups: (1) Islamists, who believe that Indonesia should be governed by Islamic law, but who are willing to work through democratic institutions in order to bring about social change; (2) radical Muslim militants, who will use violence but only for a limited and defined political outcome (some-but not all-of whom believe democracy is anathema to Islam); and (3) Muslim terrorists, who employ indiscriminate violence for revolutionary change. While the people and organizations in these categories differ in terms of their willingness to use violence, they are all committed to, at the very least, establishing sharia courts and having Islamic laws apply to all Muslims. This means that they may cooperate in some instances where they share common interests. It also means that the success or failure of one group may positively or negatively affect the fortunes of the others. The purpose of this chapter will be to examine how these groupings are or might become linked to one another, and to analyze how the success or failure of some might impact the others.
