ABSTRACT
A Chapter VII Enforcement operation differs from a Chapter VI Peacekeeping operation in more than degree. The inverse levels of consent and force will pose significantly greater threats, and the credibility of the Force will depend on its ability to keep pace with, indeed to keep ahead of, escalating violence by the parties in conflict. To the extent that the Force is able to dominate the situation, it may actually less often have to resort to extremes of force, than where it is tempting for the parties to defy or to attempt to intimidate the force. The Peace Enforcers should thus be structurally different from the Peacekeepers. The latter will be mainly light infantry – lightly armed for self-defence only, and lightly protected as well. The Enforcement Force, by contrast, should be capable of using force to induce and to maintain consent, rendering defiance and intimidation unprofitable, and highly risky to any who might try either. It will have firepower, protection and mobility greater than any potential antagonists – and will therefore likely have far fewer of them. As MacKenzie said, ‘Don’t take a knife to a gunfight’.
