ABSTRACT

Commissioned by the Cabinet Office and using hitherto untapped British Government records, this book presents an in-depth analysis of the successful project of 1986-94.

This is a vivid portrayal of the complexities of quadripartite decision-making (two countries, plus the public and private sectors), revealing new insights into the role of the British and French Governments in the process. This important book, written by Britain’s leading transport historian, will be essential reading for all those interested in PPPs, British and European economic history and international relations.

The building of the Channel Tunnel has been one of Europe’s major projects and a testimony to British-French and public-private sector collaboration. However, Eurotunnel’s current financial crisis provides a sobering backcloth for an examination of the British Government’s long-term flirtation with the project, and, in particular, the earlier Tunnel project in the 1960s and early 1970s, which was abandoned by the British Government in 1975.

 

chapter 1|15 pages

Beginnings, 1802–1945

chapter 2|30 pages

New Aspirations

The Channel Tunnel project, 1945–64

chapter 3|33 pages

Another False Start

The Wilson Governments and the Tunnel, 1964–70

chapter 4|28 pages

The Heath Government and the Tunnel

Reaching agreement, 1970–2

chapter 5|27 pages

The Heath Government and the Tunnel

Taking the project forward, 1972–4

chapter 6|37 pages

Abandonment, 1974–5

chapter 7|36 pages

Keeping Hopes Alive, 1975–81

chapter 8|40 pages

The Thatcher Governments and The Tunnel

From hope to eternity, 1981–4

chapter 9|38 pages

The Thatcher Governments and the Tunnel

Choosing a promoter, 1984–6

chapter 10|37 pages

Eurotunnel

Finance and construction, 1986–90

chapter 11|42 pages

From Tunnel to Transport Facility, 1988–94

chapter 12|22 pages

The Channel Tunnel

Postscript, 1994–2005