ABSTRACT
Exceptions to this divergence have recently begun from the behaviorist’s end and are best exemplified by the work of Robert Epstein. In collaboration with Skinner and others (Epstein, Lanza and Skinner, 1980a; Epstein, Lanza and Skinner, 1980b; Epstein and Skinner, 1981; Epstein, Kirshnit, Lanza and Rubin, 1984), Epstein has directly investigated such cognitive concepts as insight, self-awareness, and communication by manipulating animals’ histories. The results are intriguing because they demonstrate that something like insightful behavior can be performed by such animals as pigeons, and that the probability of such behaviors can be changed by the environmental history of the animal. On the basis of such data Epstein (1986) argues that there is no need for a cognitive construct such as ‘insight’, because a complete account of insightful behavior can be made by reference to the history of the organism. In the present chapter I will discuss Epstein et al.’s work on insight to make my points because some radical behaviorists seem to believe it questions the fundamental bases of cognitive psychology and because it is one of the few instances where the differences and similarities between a cognitive and radical behaviorist approach can be examined with reference to fairly common procedures.
