ABSTRACT
The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s followed in 1991 by the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself signified the end of the bipolar era. That era was distinguished by a central strategic balance that spanned the world. Although the United States seemingly emerged as the clear victor from the Cold War, especially as this was rapidly followed by the military triumph in the Gulf War, it apparently had neither the strength nor the will and indeed not the vision either to establish what its President briefly invoked as a ‘new world order’. But it must be conceded that the basis for such a vision was not readily to hand. No clear pattern of alignments had emerged to characterise the new era. Nor had a new main axis of conflict appeared to replace the old EastWest divide. Moreover, none of the leading states seemed likely to confront another with the threat of war.1 No set of issues had emerged that might serve as a focal point for focusing domestic and international attention in such a holistic way as the defunct Cold War. There was no doubt that the United States had emerged as the sole superpower, but this did not mean that it was either able or willing to exercise universal hegemony in the sense of being able to lay down the law to the rest of the world.2
