ABSTRACT
It should be noted at the outset of this chapter that the criticisms Keynes (1973:XXII–XXIII, 292–3) made of what he called ‘classical economics’ in terms of a classical dichotomy between real economy and monetary economy, or the theory of money and the theory of value, are difficult to apply to the upholders of the Marshallian Cambridge tradition discussed in this chapter, that is, Robertson, Keynes and Marshall himself. It needs equally to be emphasised that this proposition does not necessarily apply to other, sometimes self-styled, upholders of the Marshallian tradition, of which Pigou is undoubtedly the major, but not the only, example. Especially from the sixth edition onwards when it became a single, self-standing volume of foundations, Marshall’s Principles (volume 1 of an initially projected two volume treatise) 1 was very clear in its warnings that virtually all of its conclusions were to be taken as provisional. This provisional nature arose from the fact that the treatment in that volume largely left out highly pertinent aspects of money, credit, international trade, government action, market combinations and so on (Marshall 1961: esp. XII–XIII, 593–5, 722). This is the real sense in which Marshall’s Principles constitutes unfinished business. Keynes himself appears to have appreciated this facet of his master’s work (Keynes 1973:XXIX) though with rather few exceptions it since then has been ignored even when aspects of the Marshallian heritage of Maynard Keynes are explicitly being analysed.
