ABSTRACT
Despite their apparent differences all the latter moves are only possible precisely because of the impossibility of conflating naming and being; one being the other. And yet the impossibility does not hinder the fact that the name names and in naming designates a specific moment which in never being able to be
commensurate with the named allows, nonetheless, for the name’s repetition beyond itself. (Even in leaving any consideration of its necessity to one side it remains the case that the anoriginal complexity of any ‘itself’ should still be remembered.) The repetition of the name beyond its being presented, enacted, at a given point in time (a point bearing a date), and within precise confines, works to distance both the Cartesian and the Platonic conception of naming and in so doing reintroduces what what identified earlier as conflict naming. It should be added that the Platonic and the Cartesian while not taken as complete and therefore as necessarily self-completing unities can, nonetheless, be understood as bringing with them the two founding possibilities for the name; the name’s tradition.
