ABSTRACT
After the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, Anglo-French rivalry continued at a level only just below that of formal hostilities. This was especially true in North America. Indeed, a diplomatic feature of the period before the outbreak of the Seven Years War (1756–63) is the preoccupation in London and Versailles with the effects of policies in America on Europe and vice versa. Outside Europe, both sides sought to provide added security for their colonies. On the borders of Acadia, around Cape Breton and Prince Edward Islands, the British were pushing into Canada and threatening French communications between Louisburg on Cape Breton Island and Quebec on the Saint Lawrence river. Further south, British settlers were seeking to push westwards over the Appalachian mountains. Conversely, French colonial strategy was to link the Canadian territories with French possessions in Louisiana. That involved the establishment of a vast chain of communications beginning with the Great Lakes and extending southwards, by means of a series of forts and settlements in the valley of the Ohio river, to the Mississippi. If successful, such a strategy would threaten the encirclement of Britain’s east-coast colonies from Nova Scotia to Georgia. Consequently, despite the formal restoration of peace, relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate. The British view was that the resolution of the conflict in North America was crucial to the balance of power in Europe. In the recently concluded war British naval power had counterbalanced French military successes in Europe and guaranteed British successes in America. If the French were to succeed in their American ambitions, British ministers feared that they would be tempted to resume their efforts to dominate Europe.
