ABSTRACT
What shall we make of this argument? The most important thing to note is that the argument depends on the principle that “If an observer at D is fully real for O3 at F, then whatever is fully real for the observer at D is also fully real for O3 at F.” This principle does not follow from Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity but is a metaphysical assumption adopted by the proponents of the argument. The defender of the tensed theory of time need not accept this principle. Indeed, the defender of the tensed theory of time will hold that reality is relative in the very same respect that presentness is relative. For O3 at F, F has presentness and D has presentness, but the car crash G has futurity. There is no need to assume that if G is fully real for O2 at D, then it is also fully real for O3 at F. We do not assume this about presentness; we do not assume that if O2 at D has presentness relative to O3 at F, then anything that has presentness for O2 at D also has presentness for O3 at F. We assume that the event G, the car crash, is future for O3 at F. Since reality depends on what is future, present and past, we should assume that if something is future for O3 at F, then it is not-yet-real for O3 at F.
