ABSTRACT

Leonid Brezhnev was a very different leader from Khrushchev. If the latter was ebullient and confrontational, the formerwas dour and (mindful of his predecessor’s fate) sought to rule by consensus. Ultimately the leadership under Brezhnev appeared paralysed in the face of growing problems. The high economic growth rates of the 1950s inexorably fell until they stopped entirely in the early 1980s . In the social sphere greater resources were devoted to housing, health and education, but here, too, refomns appeared to run into the sands. Destalinisation under Khrushchev was only partial, and then under Brezhnev was effectively reversed. The full-scale rehabilitation of Stalin, sought by hardliners on the ninetieth anniversary of Stalin’s birth in 1969, however, did nottake place. The relative liberalisation ofthe thaw years came to an end. In foreign policy the principle of class warfare reigned supreme, although not unchallenged by some academic specialists. Stagnation at home was stimulated by Soviet expansionism abroad and exaggerated hopes of the economic benefits of detente. The social basis of stagnation at home was characterised by the ever-growing demand for unskilled workers, labour shortages, and declining productivity and labour discipline. Despite sporadic attempts at reform in the late 1960s and 1970s, the political system and society were marked by a growing listlessnes, alcoholism and the rise of dissent Attempts to impose an authoritarian model of reform by Yurii Andropov (November 1982-February 1994) were cut short by his untimely death, and his successor, Konstantin Chernenko (February 1984-March 1985) had neither the desire nor energy to pursue reforms.