ABSTRACT
Of the two components of nous obscurely related in Plato and clearly distinguished by Neoplatonists, contemplation, direct intuition was emphasized by Eastern Christianity and discursive thinking, dialectical or logical reasoning from clearly defined concepts was emphasized by the medieval West. In the early Augustine-dominated phase there is still some recognition of the difference between the two modes of knowledge; and in the twelfth century we find Dominicus Gundisalvi or Gundissalinus, Archbishop of Segovia, distinguishing in his treatise On the Soul between intelligentia and intellectus, the former acquiring wisdom through mystical knowledge, the latter arriving at ‘science’. The influences here are Augustine and Avicenna; Avicenna’s ‘active intelligence’ is interpreted as the equivalent of Augustine’s ‘illumination’ coming not from an angel but directly from God. But Aquinas does his best to bring what Gundissalinus calls intelligentia into line with intellectus and ratio. The ‘higher reason’ (ratio superior) through which eternal things are known is not, according to Aquinas, a different faculty from the ratio inferior which is the means of temporal knowledge. Nor is there any real difference between theoretical and practical reason. The mind is one, and works through its natural intellectual power, God-given but not directly inspired from any supernatural agent, even God.
