ABSTRACT
According to the BPK audit, ‘disordering’ and the flouting of rules and regulations accounted for 70 per cent of the losses, inefficiency in using state finance for 20 per cent, and ineffectiveness for 10 per cent. At least some of the funds that had disappeared from the Kostrad yayasan had been ostensibly used for other purposes, but had in fact been channelled for use in ‘black’ or covert military operations, especially as contributions to the financing of the TNI’s covert East Timor campaign of 1999 (Tempo 2000; JP 2000d, 2000e; Tempo Interaktif 2000; McCulloch 2000a). As a consequence of the furore over the leaking of the audit results, and the sacking of Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah, it was likely that there would be no further audits of military yayasan – or at the very least that the yayasan would be given ample warning to allow them to clean up their books, and that they would otherwise be much less transparent. Furthermore, the outcome of the Kostrad audit was not regarded as unusual, and many believed that it would have been reflected in any other audits of military businesses that may have been undertaken.
