Effects, a proud Scot, justice, 4 Keats Grove
Six years after signing a contract to write a book on determinism and freedom, and three years after it was due in, I had none of it done, having been otherwise engaged. My last paper, in the collection Essays on Freedom of Action, had purported to supply the philosophical and wider world with the prerequisite to further reflections on determinism, an explicit theory or formulation of the thing. But now it looked thin, just a sketch really. Could movement towards shedding real light be made by going back to the beginning and figuring out exactly what causation itself comes to? This is not something of which you have heard and to which we shall return, the matter of how we select a cause from other required conditions for something, the problem of the praising of causes. It is rather the problem of the relation between an effect and whatever precedes it. It is the traditional problem of the very nature of causation, or better, the problem of the necessitation of effects.