ABSTRACT
There is a model for the explanation of international relations, pessimistically named ‘realism’, which takes it that states are necessarily engaged in a competitive struggle for power. The model, in both its explanatory and normative aspects is, of course, Hobbesian. The power of Hobbes’s original theory derives from the integrity of his theory of political obligation and his theory of practical reason. A reason-statement of the form ‘A ought to Φ’ means ‘A has instrumental reason to Φ’ which means ‘A has some interest which is best served by Φ-ing’. The universal interest in security is the basis for the universal rational obligation to contract into a state, governed by an absolute sovereign. Thereafter, the authority of the sovereign derives from his effectiveness in sustaining peace, and his effectiveness derives from his monopoly of coercive power within the state. Since, however, we lack a global sovereign, states continue in the state of nature with respect to one another. It is quite unclear how this model can account even for limited cooperative behaviour between states, since the absence of a Leviathan means that the conditions for trust, and hence for contract, are absent. However, in so far as it tries to do so, such cooperation is explained in terms of the perceived national self-interest of the cooperating parties. If it makes sense at all within a realist framework to speak of the obligations of one state to another, these are limited to positive obligations derived from specific treaties made with some mutual benefit in view, and honoured for just as long as it is expedient to do so.
