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Common knowledge, then – that is, ‘what everyone knows’ – is necessarily something that is culture-loaded and varies from group to group. Much of what everyone knows is also either scientifically unwarranted or very superficial. For example, there are numerous stereotypes in this kind of knowledge – ideas we have about the ‘typical’ behaviour and characteristics of people or objects. But that should not surprise us, because, after all, that is essentially what norms them-selves are in one sense – abstractions based on certain kinds of experiences which apparently typify some kind of general behaviour. Many people go through life holding the view that common knowledge and stereotypes characterize a sort of truth about the world; others are somewhat more critical and conscious of the complexities that lie behind such a simple belief. What we must not assume, how-ever, is that common knowledge is always false and stereotyping is always bad; social harmony is possible only if there are things we can agree on, and there are measures of agreement. What may be important is how fixed are the measures any society uses, not the existence of the measures themselves. In periods of rapid social change old norms and stereotypes come under attack at a time when new ones are not available, so it is not surprising that confusion results. Linguistic behaviour at such times tends to reflect the disorder. Some strive to preserve the old ways, as conservative factions in Greece did in the 1960s to reimpose a ‘high’ variety of Greek. Others want to create a new set of condi-tions, for example, to rid a language of a tu–vous distinction in address forms, as did both the French and Russian revolutionaries (but eliminating the vous form in one case and the tu form in the other). Eventually new norms emerge, new appear-ances, new conventions, and new ways of using language to express these new norms with all the advantages, and disadvantages, of the old, offering as they do a way of constructing a certain kind of reality as well as providing blinkers which make other realities somewhat inaccessible to view. One consequence of all this is that we must set limits on the amount of trust we place in others and in our view of the world. Similarly, in conversation we should not trust absolutely: that is too severe a demand to make both of our-selves and of others. Those who give their absolute trust to others are almost cer-tain at one time or another to be disappointed. But we must also be aware that distrust cannot be the norm either, for a climate in which everyone distrusts every-one else would prohibit entirely all hope of mutually beneficial social contact. Therefore, we must err at all times on the side of trust. Unfortunately, those who would deceive us know that too, and, having confidence in their ability to exploit this basic social need, proceed to do so, often with impunity. For any particular conversation it is also possible to show that there are differences between the parties in the specific things that they know in contrast to the kinds of background knowledge that they share. No two people have identical backgrounds, so in any conversation the participants will have different kinds of knowledge about almost any topic that is likely to be mentioned. If only two people, Fred and Sally, are involved, there will be certain matters known to both, some because ‘everybody knows such things’ and others because both Fred and Sally happen to know them. Then there will be matters known to only one
DOI link for Common knowledge, then – that is, ‘what everyone knows’ – is necessarily something that is culture-loaded and varies from group to group. Much of what everyone knows is also either scientifically unwarranted or very superficial. For example, there are numerous stereotypes in this kind of knowledge – ideas we have about the ‘typical’ behaviour and characteristics of people or objects. But that should not surprise us, because, after all, that is essentially what norms them-selves are in one sense – abstractions based on certain kinds of experiences which apparently typify some kind of general behaviour. Many people go through life holding the view that common knowledge and stereotypes characterize a sort of truth about the world; others are somewhat more critical and conscious of the complexities that lie behind such a simple belief. What we must not assume, how-ever, is that common knowledge is always false and stereotyping is always bad; social harmony is possible only if there are things we can agree on, and there are measures of agreement. What may be important is how fixed are the measures any society uses, not the existence of the measures themselves. In periods of rapid social change old norms and stereotypes come under attack at a time when new ones are not available, so it is not surprising that confusion results. Linguistic behaviour at such times tends to reflect the disorder. Some strive to preserve the old ways, as conservative factions in Greece did in the 1960s to reimpose a ‘high’ variety of Greek. Others want to create a new set of condi-tions, for example, to rid a language of a tu–vous distinction in address forms, as did both the French and Russian revolutionaries (but eliminating the vous form in one case and the tu form in the other). Eventually new norms emerge, new appear-ances, new conventions, and new ways of using language to express these new norms with all the advantages, and disadvantages, of the old, offering as they do a way of constructing a certain kind of reality as well as providing blinkers which make other realities somewhat inaccessible to view. One consequence of all this is that we must set limits on the amount of trust we place in others and in our view of the world. Similarly, in conversation we should not trust absolutely: that is too severe a demand to make both of our-selves and of others. Those who give their absolute trust to others are almost cer-tain at one time or another to be disappointed. But we must also be aware that distrust cannot be the norm either, for a climate in which everyone distrusts every-one else would prohibit entirely all hope of mutually beneficial social contact. Therefore, we must err at all times on the side of trust. Unfortunately, those who would deceive us know that too, and, having confidence in their ability to exploit this basic social need, proceed to do so, often with impunity. For any particular conversation it is also possible to show that there are differences between the parties in the specific things that they know in contrast to the kinds of background knowledge that they share. No two people have identical backgrounds, so in any conversation the participants will have different kinds of knowledge about almost any topic that is likely to be mentioned. If only two people, Fred and Sally, are involved, there will be certain matters known to both, some because ‘everybody knows such things’ and others because both Fred and Sally happen to know them. Then there will be matters known to only one
Common knowledge, then – that is, ‘what everyone knows’ – is necessarily something that is culture-loaded and varies from group to group. Much of what everyone knows is also either scientifically unwarranted or very superficial. For example, there are numerous stereotypes in this kind of knowledge – ideas we have about the ‘typical’ behaviour and characteristics of people or objects. But that should not surprise us, because, after all, that is essentially what norms them-selves are in one sense – abstractions based on certain kinds of experiences which apparently typify some kind of general behaviour. Many people go through life holding the view that common knowledge and stereotypes characterize a sort of truth about the world; others are somewhat more critical and conscious of the complexities that lie behind such a simple belief. What we must not assume, how-ever, is that common knowledge is always false and stereotyping is always bad; social harmony is possible only if there are things we can agree on, and there are measures of agreement. What may be important is how fixed are the measures any society uses, not the existence of the measures themselves. In periods of rapid social change old norms and stereotypes come under attack at a time when new ones are not available, so it is not surprising that confusion results. Linguistic behaviour at such times tends to reflect the disorder. Some strive to preserve the old ways, as conservative factions in Greece did in the 1960s to reimpose a ‘high’ variety of Greek. Others want to create a new set of condi-tions, for example, to rid a language of a tu–vous distinction in address forms, as did both the French and Russian revolutionaries (but eliminating the vous form in one case and the tu form in the other). Eventually new norms emerge, new appear-ances, new conventions, and new ways of using language to express these new norms with all the advantages, and disadvantages, of the old, offering as they do a way of constructing a certain kind of reality as well as providing blinkers which make other realities somewhat inaccessible to view. One consequence of all this is that we must set limits on the amount of trust we place in others and in our view of the world. Similarly, in conversation we should not trust absolutely: that is too severe a demand to make both of our-selves and of others. Those who give their absolute trust to others are almost cer-tain at one time or another to be disappointed. But we must also be aware that distrust cannot be the norm either, for a climate in which everyone distrusts every-one else would prohibit entirely all hope of mutually beneficial social contact. Therefore, we must err at all times on the side of trust. Unfortunately, those who would deceive us know that too, and, having confidence in their ability to exploit this basic social need, proceed to do so, often with impunity. For any particular conversation it is also possible to show that there are differences between the parties in the specific things that they know in contrast to the kinds of background knowledge that they share. No two people have identical backgrounds, so in any conversation the participants will have different kinds of knowledge about almost any topic that is likely to be mentioned. If only two people, Fred and Sally, are involved, there will be certain matters known to both, some because ‘everybody knows such things’ and others because both Fred and Sally happen to know them. Then there will be matters known to only one
ABSTRACT
Common knowledge, then – that is, ‘what everyone knows’ – is necessarily something that is culture-loaded and varies from group to group. Much of what everyone knows is also either scientifically unwarranted or very superficial. For example, there are numerous stereotypes in this kind of knowledge – ideas we have about the ‘typical’ behaviour and characteristics of people or objects. But that should not surprise us, because, after all, that is essentially what norms themselves are in one sense – abstractions based on certain kinds of experiences which apparently typify some kind of general behaviour. Many people go through life holding the view that common knowledge and stereotypes characterize a sort of truth about the world; others are somewhat more critical and conscious of the complexities that lie behind such a simple belief. What we must not assume, however, is that common knowledge is always false and stereotyping is always bad; social harmony is possible only if there are things we can agree on, and there are measures of agreement. What may be important is how fixed are the measures any society uses, not the existence of the measures themselves.
