Hegel’s consummate philosophy: The univocity of Geist
Hegel endeavoured to enable nothing to be, since he understood nihilism as not merely negative.3 We know from earlier chapters that if nothing is to be, it must provide all that ‘something’ could be said to provide, preventing itself from being lack. If nothing is but lack, then nothing cannot be said to be; for its non-provision will present a space for the otherness of transcendence, one which would provide. If Hegel is to be read as attempting such a nihilism then we must examine his moves in rigorous terms of ontology, not merely attending to various ontic peculiarities or methodologies. For any examination that concentrates on the merely ontic will be too caught up in the movement of his ‘system’, and only look to see where things are going, not that they are going, and in what way.