ABSTRACT
In his recent Dewey Lectures Putnam undertakes a radical improvement of what he takes to be ‘a middle way between reactionary metaphysics and irresponsible relativism’ (Putnam 1994b: 447), or, to put in less committed words, between metaphysical realism and radical anti-realism, that is, between the view that assumes not only that reality is mind independent but also that the way in which it is structured uniquely determines the totality of its correct descriptions, and the view that makes even the external reality dependent on our mental activities, interests, etc. At the present stage of the development of his views, Putnam wants to approach as closely as possible the old good realism of the common man by defending some form of direct realism in the theory of perception (or, as he prefers to call it, ‘natural realism’). This move is motivated not just by Putnam's characteristic ‘and constant dissatisfaction with the former formulations of his own views; besides that it is driven by realising that while being preoccupied with issues in the philosophy of language and mind, he has unduly neglected the more fundamental issues concerning the nature of perception. In his opinion this has been a particularly bad metaphilosophical strategy, since without a satisfactory account of perception one cannot see ‘how thought and language hook on to the world’ and resolve the question of realism.
