ABSTRACT
As conceptualized through a constructivist lens, identity is not a source of order. So where does this leave the study of international order? In this chapter, I argue that in spite of the limitations of constructivist theory to coherently explain how, there is still empirical reason to suspect identity as a source of order. Consider “the Suez Puzzle.”1 In 1956, Egyptian President Abdel Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Britain, acting in cooperation with France and Israel, used force to reverse the nationalization. Against expressed American preferences and in secrecy, the three colluded to invade Egypt. In the context of the Cold War and the East-West struggle for the allegiance of the Middle East, the Americans were deeply concerned about the implications of this act. Beyond that they were aghast at the duplicity of their allies, especially the British, with whom the Americans had long shared a well-known “Special Relationship” based on trust and mutual consultation. So given the high stakes of this situation-both in terms of the Cold War and the wounded American ego vis-a-vis its allies-the American response to the situation was curious. They demanded that the British and French withdraw immediately from the Canal Zone, but they never threatened their fallen allies with their considerable military might. Instead, the U.S. relied on sanctions and diplomatic pressure. Indeed, military force was never even discussed as an option. The puzzle of the Suez Crisis lies in understanding why.
